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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
5. A court may take judicial notice of its own records, but only in
those of the case on trial. It may not properly notice judicially the pen-
dency of proceedings in other causes in the same court, even between
the same parties.9 '
SAMUEL SONENFIELD
CONFUCT OF LAWS
Of necessity the author of a Survey article must decide which cases
are sufficiently significant for inclusion and which should be discarded.
Accordingly, I have omrutted certain cases within the conflict of laws area
which, to my mind, are of minor significance, as well as some in which,
although the court pronounced a neat hornbook conflict of laws rule, the
decision actually depended upon other factors.
Full Faith and Credit
Most of the important cases appearing in 1956 deal with full faith
and credit. It is fundamental that a second state is not required to give
full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister state if the court render-
ing the judgment did not have jurisdiction. This principle was applied
to a judgment by confession in Antonelli v. Silvestri,' in which the court
refused to give full faith and credit to a Pennsylvania judgment by con-
fession, for the very good reason that the words of the rental agreement
containing the authority to confess were not broad enough to constitute
a consent to the judgment as entered. Consequently, the Pennsylvania
court lacked jurisdiction.2
In the 1954 Survey,3 I referred to Armstrong v. Armstrong,4 in which
the Supreme Court of Ohio properly refused to give full faith and credit
to the decree of a Florida court denying alimony to a defendant wife over
whom the court had no jurisdiction in personam. The case eventually
wended its way to the Supreme Court of the United States, which af-
firmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio.5 However, the ma-
jority of the Court thought that the alimony issue was not adjudicated m
the Florida proceedings; hence, no question of full faith and credit arose.
Four of the Justices affirmed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, thereby
agreeing with the Ohio court.
Blumberg v. Saylor,6 while in no way denying the applicability of the
full faith and credit clause7 to an Indiana decree ordering a father to pay
a stipulated amount monthly for the support of his child, nevertheless
9 Weber v. Sproat, 137 N.E.2d 640 (Ohio App. 1955)
rUune
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holds that under the particular circumstances, a release by the mother to
the father constituted a defense to an action for back installments, and
that no violation of the full faith and credit clause arose thereby.8
The Blumberg case holds also that subjecting a sister state judgment
to the forum's statute of limitations m an action on the judgment, is not
violative of full faith and credit.9
Motor Vehicles: Title and Liens
Ohio Revised Code section 4505.04 has given rise to some trouble-
some problems.' 0 The pertinent part of this section provides that no
court shall recognize the right, -ide, dam or interest of any person in or
to any motor vehicle unless evidenced by a certificate of tide. In Gibson
v. Bolner," the Supreme Court of 01o held that the statute has no ap-
plication in a situation where the person is not required to obtain an
Ohio certificate of tide, and the court recognized a Florida certificate of
tide designating a gentleman named Bartlett as holding a first lien on the
trailer involved in the action. Recognition was based upon the point
that an out-of-state certificate of tide is a public act and record of the
160 Oluo Op. 262,137 N.E.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1955).
2Among other things, the document authorized any attorney of record to confess
judgment, but the judgment was confessed by an "esquire."
81954 Survey, 6 WEST. RES. L. REv. 228 (1955).
' 162 Ohio St. 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954)
'Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
100 Ohio App. 479, 137 N.E.2d 696, appeal dismssed, 164 Ohio St. 188, 129
N.E.2d 383 (1955).
7U.S. CONsT. art IV, § 1.
'The validity of the release is not a conflict of laws question. However, it is interest-
ing to note that the child's welfare was in no way affected, and that in reality the
mother was attempting to enforce the Indiana decree for the purpose of obtaining
reimbursement for money paid out by her in behalf of the child. Actually, at the
time of the lawsuit, the child was no longer a minor and had been married for many
years.
'Blumberg v. Saylor, 100 Ohio App. 479, 484, 137 N.E.2d 696, 701 (1955). The
facts do not show whether or not the Indiana statute of limitations had run. Appar-
ently the court regards that as immaterial. Many years ago, the Supreme Court of
the United States decided that the forum state may subject the judgment of a sister
state to the forum's statute of limitations, and that this does not violate the full faith
and credit clause. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Peters) 312 (1839).
A recent decision by the Ohio Supreme Court contains a full faith and credit
angle, but it is so intertwined with the certificate of title law that I will consider the
case under that heading. Gibson v. Bolner, 165 Ohio St. 357, 135 N.E.2d 353
(1956).
"
0 See 1955 Survey, 7 WFsT. RES. L REv. 253 (1956); 1954 Survey, 6 WEST. RES.
L. REV. 229 (1955); 1953 Survey, 5 WEST. RES. L. REV. 250 (1954).
' 165 Ohio St. 357, 135 N.E.2d 353 (1956).
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state where issued, and as such is entitled to full faith and credit provided
that no violence is done to the established policy of Ohio as expressed
in its statutes. Here, no violence was done because, as stated above, the
Ohio statute did not apply. The court distinguished Kelley Kar Co. v.
Finkler,12 and remarked that the present case is strikingly similar to In re
Swesey.13
Legislative Jurisdiction: Acts Done Outside State: Bastardy
In the interesting case of Yaw v. Hilton,'4 the Supreme Court held
that under Ohio Revised Code section 3111.01 et seq., a proceeding in
bastardy may be maintained against a man who is a resident of and is
domiciled in Ohio, despite the fact that the child was begotten, conceived
and born in another state and that the mother and child were never resi-
dents of Ohio. The court held that such an action may be maintained
regardless of the laws of the other state. The general principle was an-
nounced that the statutory law of the forum state may in some instances
provide for or create a cause of action based upon something done be-
yond its borders, where the forum state has a reasonable interest in im-
posing the particular obligation. The court quoted extensively from sec-
tion 455 of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws and the comment there-
to. To the argument of counsel that a bastardy action is a civil action in
tort and that the place of the alleged wrong determines whether there can
be a cause of action in tort, the court replied that the existence of this
cause of action depends upon the Ohio bastardy statutes rather than upon
the ordinary conflict of laws rules governing torts.
Decedents' Estates: Ancillary Administration
Ohio Revised Code section 2129.04 provides for ancillary administra-
non of the estate of a nonresident of Ohio in any county where property
of the decedent is located. In the case of In re Wilcox,15 Mr. Wilcox,
who apparently lived in Colorado, was involved in an automobile accident
in Vinton County, Ohio. People by the names of Shelby and Tripp, all
domiciled in Ohio, were in the other car. Wilcox died. The Shelbys and
Tripp filed daims in Colorado against the Wilcox estate, arising out of
" 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951); 1955 Survey, 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 254
(1956); 1954 Survey, 6 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 229 (1955); 1953 Survey, 5 WEST.
REs. L. REv. 250 (1954).
" 112 F. Supp. 773 (N.D. Ohio 1953); 1953 Survey, 5 WEST. Rus. L. Ruv. 250
(1954).
11165 Ohio St. 164, 134 N.E.2d 719 (1956). The court approved and followed
McGary v. Bevmngton, 41 Ohio St. 280 (1884).
'60 Ohio Op. 232, 137 N.E.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1955).
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